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The rhetoric of a ‘win-win-win’ situation – which represents simultaneous achievement of 
economic growth, environmental protection and social development – is central to the 
emergence of community-based wildlife protection efforts that involve new partnerships 
between actors such as local communities, businesses and government agencies. The 
win-win rhetoric furthers the logic that the more partners, the more wins – yet the current 
knowledge base lacks clear criteria for evaluating partnerships. This working paper uses 
political ecology as a conceptual lens to propose such criteria. We suggest examining 
partnerships not only based on their complexity, but also how they are formed and gain 
legitimacy in different contexts and how various partnership configurations engender 
particular kinds of ecological and socio-economic outcomes. Based on a review of the 
literature about partnerships and their impacts, and drawing on insights from Tanzania’s 
wildlife sector, we establish three groups of literature that emphasize the benefits of 
partnerships: one focusing on landscape conservation, another on governance reforms 
and the last on tourism related businesses. In these three groups of literature, 
partnerships are claimed to improve the effectiveness of biodiversity governance by 
securing land, facilitating local developments and by creating business links. Building on 
critiques from political ecology we conclude by questioning this win-win-win rhetoric 
arguing that partnerships only lead to wins for specific actors thereby indirectly 
aggravating local power struggles. They do so by supporting rent seeking and the rise of 
local elites while simultaneously concealing the marginalization of other actors and 
thereby effectively contributing to the continued loss of local land rights.  
 
Key words: partnerships, wildlife, community-based conservation and sustainability  
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1. Introduction 
 
The rhetoric of a ‘win-win-win’ situation – which represents simultaneous achievement of 
economic growth, environmental protection and social development – is central to the 
emergence of community-based wildlife protection efforts that involve new partnerships 
between actors such as local communities, businesses and government agencies. The 
win-win-win rhetoric furthers the logic that the more partners are involved, the more ‘wins’ 
a partnership will achieve. Yet, the current knowledge base lacks clear definitions of 
success and criteria for evaluating partnerships (Van Huijstee et al., 2007). This working 
paper aims to use political ecology as a conceptual lens to propose such criteria. The 
political ecology lens pays particular attention to the politics of struggles over the control 
of, and access to, natural resources, and the role of social constructions of the 
environment and power relations in shaping partnership dynamics and outcomes (Jones, 
2006). Political ecologists have actively engaged in many of the debates surrounding 
human-nature relations with some of the these studies examining biophysical processes 
alongside social and economic factors (Bryant and Bailey, 1997) leading to numerous 
studies that question the relationship between social relations of production, their 
influence on community choices and access to environmental resources (Peluso, 1993, 
Fabinyi et al., 2014, Pedersen, 2016). Accordingly, we suggest examining partnerships 
not only based on their complexity (in terms of number of actors, actor categories, the 
decision-making structure and the degree of sharing of resource access rights (Ponte et 
al., 2017), but also how they are formed, gain legitimacy in different contexts and the way 
various partnership configurations engender particular kinds of ecological and socio-
economic outcomes. 
 
Based on a review of the literature about partnerships and their impacts, and drawing on 
insights from Tanzania’s wildlife sector, we establish three groups of literature that 
emphasize the benefits of partnerships. The first group of contributions focuses on 
landscape conservation and how partnerships have proliferated from the need to 
establish large-scale areas that accommodate wildlife but must remain human habited 
zones. Subsequently, the institutional architecture adjacent to these large conservation 
areas needed natural resource governance reform across the Global South – mainly to 
create structures for the operationalization of community-based conservation.  
 
The second group of literature focuses on partnerships that have emerged through 
tourism-related businesses, which are considered key ingredient for bridging 
conservation and local development. In these two groups of literature, partnerships are 
claimed to be improving the effectiveness of biodiversity governance by securing land, 
facilitating local development and creating business links. Building on critiques from 
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political ecology, we conclude by questioning this ‘win-win-win’ rhetoric, and by 
observing that partnerships reinforce protection for wildlife but mainly lead to wins for 
only some actors, thereby indirectly aggravating local power struggles. Political 
ecologists have analysed how this happens through, among other things, supporting 
protected area expansion, rent-seeking and the rise of local elites, while simultaneously 
contributing to the continued loss of local land rights. Drawing from different theoretical 
perspectives – conservation scale, governance reforms and market-based conservation 
partnerships – we seek to add new dimension to the discussions about partnerships in 
natural resource management, namely, the ways that different partnership configurations 
emerge, whether and how their degree of complexity might influence both wildlife 
conservation and livelihood outcomes.  
 
 
2. Perspectives on wildlife conservation partnerships: Theoretical insights 
 
Actions to protect biodiversity (whether through protected areas or community-based 
approaches) are inherently political (Bryant and Bailey, 1997, Adams and Hutton, 2007). 
One of the cornerstones of political ecology is to illuminate such links between 
environmental protection and political dynamics. The field has supported the emergence 
of literature on the politics and economics of the creation of protected areas (see for 
example Neumann, 1998, Ramutsindela, 2004, Brockington and Igoe, 2006, West et al., 
2006, Bryant, 2015), the role of the state in providing direction, legitimisation and 
exercise of power and control, and the convergence of non-governmental actors in 
supporting conservation (Levine, 2002, Igoe and Croucher, 2007, MacDonald, 2010b, 
Adams et al., 2016). Recently, however, there has been a shift in focus to the micro-politics 
of peasant struggles over access to resources (Watts, 2013, Gardner, 2016, Wright, 2017) 
calling for the need to further examine how multiple actors with complex and overlapping 
identities, affinities and interests continue to shape local social and ecological relations 
of power (Rocheleau, 2008, MacDonald, 2010a). 
 
Understanding multi-level actions of different actors is key if we are to make a nuanced 
contribution to the analysis of conservation partnerships. This requires acknowledging 
that political and social processes relate to each other at a number of nested scales, from 
the local to the global (Bryant and Bailey, 1997), and that control over nature starts from 
the construction and manipulation of these scales (Swyngedouw, 2004). Many of the 
themes that weave together political ecology approaches are essentially scalar in their 
nature and rest on the central importance placed on the role of power relations in shaping 
access to, and control over, environmental resources and space (Neumann, 2009). 
Engaging comprehensively with scalar processes is called for in the assessment of multi-
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level actions of different conservation actors whose funds and expertise have re-
configured African landscapes (Ramutsindela and Noe, 2015, Green, 2016). This 
engagement is necessary because conditions that redefine access and control over the 
local space are inherently embedded in the scale construction processes that 
partnerships are called for. Zulu (2009) supports this further with the case of community-
based natural resource management (CBRNM) in Malawi – arguing that it is in the making 
of new conservation scales that strong patterns of winners and losers are created, local 
livelihoods disrupted and tensions brewed between modern and traditional institutions 
(Zulu, 2009) 
 
These observations support the view held by Crawford (2003) on the rhetorical and 
instrumental use of 'partnership' by international actors. These partnerships have 
subsequently supported governance reforms only to disguise and legitimise the 
interventions of external agencies in domestic policy reforms that mystify power 
asymmetry. Contrary to the official discourse of encouraging locally-formulated reform 
strategies, partnerships reflect conspicuously the power of neoliberalism, its reshaping of 
landscapes and profound alterations of the lives of rural people in areas targeted for 
conservation. The agenda of international agencies remains relatively unchallenged, 
both in terms of what is included and what is excluded (Crawford, 2003). It is becoming 
clear that conservation is an organized political project in which private sector businesses 
and their networks are dominant, hence transforming conservation in ways that 
accommodate the interests of global capital (MacDonald, 2010). At the same time, 
despite the cloying and deceitful rhetoric and the adverse outcomes of new partnerships 
for some of the local partners, they can still provide institutions and resources for 
otherwise marginalised rural groups to challenge powerful interests (Wright, 2017). 
 
In the rest of this section, we engage further with the literature on specific theoretical 
aspects of partnerships in relation to conservation scales, governance reforms and 
economic development (specifically through tourism). Our focus on these areas relates 
to the patterns emerging in the literature, which suggest that partnership configurations 
in wildlife are determined by how threats are defined, and their solutions reconciled for 
action by different global actors. In recent literature, concerns that wildlife is continuously 
threatened by increasing human population and related activities have been 
accompanied by further threats arising from climate change and illicit exploitation for 
domestic and international markets (Breuer et al., 2016, Shaffer and Bishop, 2016), and 
by alternative models for restoration of ecosystems (some focusing on specific species 
requirements for habitats).  
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Three of these alternative models are important for our discussion. The first is an 
emerging consensus that conservation actions must be scaled up to secure large 
landscapes for wildlife protection. Securing large landscapes for wildlife is closely related 
to the need for re-establishing ecological connectivity (and network of protected areas) 
that has been broken by humans. The logic here is that stand-alone protected areas that 
are already threatened and isolated have lost their ability to offer protection and refuge 
for wildlife hence the need to redefine the appropriate scale of conservation (Adams et 
al., 2016). The second alternative model is the shifting of centres of power from central 
governments to accord greater responsibilities for wildlife protection to local institutions 
and communities through community-based conservation. This alternative is closely 
linked to the first one mentioned – as it is the means through which land is secured for 
wildlife protection outside core-protected areas. The third model is that nature should be 
marketed in order to pay for its own protection while also serving local development 
objectives.  
 
These alternatives entail significant shift of practices and policies that govern 
conservation of natural resources (Ribot and Oyono, 2006, Berkes, 2010, Adams et al., 
2016) calling for the private sector and development agencies to play major facilitation 
roles. Support is also mobilized for actions that cover a large spatial scale, usually 
addressing a range of development objectives, conservation processes and land uses 
(Clark et al., 2014). As the focus shifts from traditional protected areas towards socio-
economic landscapes, for example, changes occur also in the number and composition 
of actors and institutions involved in finance, and in technical and management 
responsibilities. In the following discussion, we expand on how different theories inform 
these alternative models and what actions and impacts have resulted from their 
implementation.  
 
2.1 Partnerships for constructing conservation scale  
Theories of conservation biology support the redefinition of scale when emphasizing that 
meta-populations - spatially structured populations - are affected by spatial patterns of 
habitat loss hence reducing the ability of species to persist in the fragmented landscapes 
(Clark et al., 2014). So too, landscape ecology theories emphasize that conservation 
outcomes are determined by spatial heterogeneity, linkages, and interactions between 
ecological patterns and processes as well as their variations with scale (Lindborg and 
Eriksson, 2004, Lindenmayer and Hobbs, 2008) (Lindborg and Eriksson, 2004, Hilty et al., 
2006, Lindenmayer and Hobbs, 2008). These two ecological perspectives suggest that 
contiguous and un-fragmented habitats support ecological processes and meet the 
habitat requirements of wildlife species that have extensive home ranges or migrate over 
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large territories. These species and their requirements for migration and dispersal 
corridors differ but range from jaguars in South America, orangutans, wolves, tigers and 
elephants in Asia and Africa (Steinmetz et al., 2006, Boitani et al., 2007) as well as various 
types of migratory birds. Due to their charisma and/or perceived levels of survival threats, 
protection of these species have attracted global attention hence calling for action plans 
that legitimate constructing structural and functional connectivity through the concept of 
buffer zones and migratory corridors (Boitani et al., 2007). 
 
Over time, these theories have been the basis for policy-oriented partnerships that have 
effectively changed discourses on the scale of conservation across the global south. 
Whereas the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) builds on these theories and 
remains the general framework for biodiversity conservation worldwide, international 
organizations have converged to form policy-oriented partnerships – some of them 
focusing mainly on international policy processes that determine how activities of other 
actors are organized to support the achievement of the desired landscape connectivity. 
For example, cultural landscapes are identified and accorded protection status as World 
Heritage Sites through the World Heritage and Man and Biosphere Reserve programs 
(MAB) of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
(Breymeyer, 2000, Rossler, 2000). In addition, UNESCO guided the establishment of 
Biosphere Reserves based on a geographical zoning scheme, which comprises clearly 
delineated and legally protected core areas, buffer zones and cooperation areas (Ajathi 
and Krumme, 2002). 
 
The idea for this zoning is that core wildlife areas are secured by international laws while 
partnerships are developed to facilitate protection of the neighbouring socio-cultural 
landscapes (recognized as cooperation zones). While UNESCO has retained the mandate 
to monitor and assess what is reserved – irrespective of whether it is managed by the 
government, trusts, private individuals or institutions at national, regional and 
international levels (Green and Paine, 1997) – it has also built an integrated landscape 
management strategy that guides coordination, planning and management of buffer 
zones and other land uses around protected landscapes, thus providing cross-
jurisdictional consistency (Brunckhorst, 2000). 
 
In 2003, IUCN proposed a conservation category called Community Conservation Areas 
(CCAs)1, which was adopted in the Fifth World Parks Congress held in Durban during the 
																																																						
1 Officially defined as natural and/or modified ecosystems containing significant biodiversity values, 
ecological services and cultural values, voluntarily conserved by indigenous and local communities 
through customary laws or other effective means (IUCN, 2005). 
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same year. The congress recommended that the recognition of CCAs be an urgent 
necessity and a tool for strengthening the management and expansion of the world’s 
protected areas, promoting connectivity at landscape and seascape level and enhancing 
public support for protected areas (Pathak et al., 2004, IUCN, 2005). Specific 
recommendations were thus made for governments to recognize CCAs as legitimate 
conservation tools, and to assign them to national and international protected area 
categories as appropriate. Today, CCAs guide the establishment and management of 
community-based wildlife management areas across the world. Conservation 
organizations and funding agencies have facilitated partnerships with states and local 
communities to establish Community Resource Management Areas (CREMAs) in Ghana  
(Parren and Sam, 2003, Baruah et al., 2016), communal and private conservancies in 
Namibia and community-wildlife management areas (WMAs) in Botswana and Tanzania 
(Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007, Gallo et al., 2009, Noe and Kangalawe, 2015). 
 
Based on the cross-jurisdictional scale defined by UNESCO and IUCN – and coupled with 
other binding agreements on international cooperation in wildlife protection, including 
the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the 
Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) – conservation organizations and funding 
agencies around the world have developed diverse approaches to conservation planning 
at the scale of landscape and seascape. Some of these large landscape projects in Africa 
include WWF’s ecoregions 2  (Jenkins and Joppa, 2009), AWF’s African Heartlands 3 
(Burgess et al., 2004, Muruthi and Frohardt, 2006) and Peace Parks Foundation’s (PPF) 
trans-frontier conservation areas4.  
 
There is an element of packaging and fundraising concern in these projects. Sachedina 
(2008), for example, has shown that the AWF heartlands idea was so-named in order to 
appeal to US donors for whom the heartland concept resonated. Yet these concepts also 
hit the ground in ways which require concrete actions and multiple forms of partnership 
(Sachedina, 2010). Due to different kinds of land use, tenure and ownership systems 
across landscapes, these organizations and their projects have without exception 
depended entirely on establishing partnerships with states, local communities and 
private landowners to secure contiguous cross-jurisdictional land for wildlife protection. 
 
																																																						
2 Defined as terrestrial or aquatic areas that are characterized by distinctive large or groupings of regional 
landforms 
3 Defined as large landscapes of exceptional wildlife and natural value extending across states, private, 
and communal lands 
4 Defined as conservation landscapes that straddle borders of two or more countries and include state, 
private and communal lands 
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The main argument here is that managing the transition from planning to practices that 
facilitate the reorganization of land and other resource tenure and ownership systems 
calls for participation of landowners (states, local communities and private trusts), 
conservation actors, donors and development agencies (Baldus et al., 2003, Bluwstein et 
al., 2016). In Tanzania, development agencies such as the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF), the German, Danish and US governments (through GTZ/KfW, DANIDA and USAID) 
and international conservation NGOs such as WWF, AWF, Frankfurt Zoological Society 
(FZS), Care International and Africare, have all converged to facilitate this transition.5 How 
specifically these and other actors formulate partnerships for intervention in particular 
local contexts is captured well in the case of Tanzania’s Selous Game Reserve:   
 
The Stephenson Report (1987) proposed a multi-donor approach, which was 
adopted by all parties concerned. Frankfurt Zoological Society supported the 
Selous Game Reserve with an aircraft and road-building machinery. The African 
Wildlife Foundation assigned a mechanic, equipped with a mobile workshop in the 
reserve’s headquarters. The Worldwide Fund for Nature provided an elephant and 
rhino biologist. Together with the Wildlife Division the four donors jointly planned 
the necessary activities and implemented them in a coordinated and coherent way. 
In retrospect it can be said that this partnership venture led to a fast but thorough 
rehabilitation of the reserve and contributed greatly to conservation success. In 
1999 the European Union joined the partnership by supporting the Selous Rhino 
Trust, a Tanzanian NGO. For administrative reasons, GTZ became the facilitating 
agency for this aspect (Baldus et al., 2003). 
 
 
2.2 Partnerships for governance reform 
Interventions by powerful actors as those mentioned above have pushed for governance 
reforms in different contexts. Governance theory recognizes the importance of different 
stakeholders (state, market and civil society) in solving problems and in creating 
opportunities. Analyses of conservation partnerships represent a prominent part of the 
governance literature. Existing work suggests that following numerous sets of actors in 
the management of natural resources, governance (in the sense of authoritative setting 
and implementation of rules) can no longer be exerted exclusively by the state or public 
actors but through multi-stakeholder partnerships (Edwards et al., 2001, Berkes, 2010, 
Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012). Accordingly, many discussions have revolved around the 
link between the formation of partnerships, the role of local institutions and communities, 
and the transfer of powers (Ribot and Oyono, 2006, Adams et al., 2016) – generally 
																																																						
5 These actors sponsor up to 40% of the total national budget and 90% of conservation activities (URT, 
1998, Levine, 2002; Nelson et al, 2007) 
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arguing that partnerships have reinvented conservation governance by setting the 
agenda and leading discourses and rules that govern wildlife protection (Mercer, 2003, 
Martin et al., 2011, Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012). In this review, we focus mainly on how 
reforms in the wildlife sector are both the agent and the outcome of partnerships, and 
how power plays out in the relevant interactions.  
 
Since the Agenda 21 of the Rio conference advocated for shifting governance from the 
national to the local level, concerted efforts to decentralize natural resource governance 
tool place, with almost all developing countries undertaking decentralization reforms 
(Ribot, 2002, Larson and Soto, 2008). In place of top-down management, principles of 
‘grassroot’ or bottom-up planning and management, such as public participation and co-
management, became entrenched. Despite some differences in their formation and 
outcomes, public participation, collaboration and co-management related largely to 
devolving management powers to local-level governments and other institutions (Ribot 
and Oyono, 2006, Berkes, 2010). Hence, devolution (the transfer of rights and 
responsibilities to local groups, organizations and local-level governments that have 
autonomous discretionary decision-making powers) and decentralization (the transfer of 
rights and responsibilities from the central to the local branches of the same institutions) 
have been common subjects of discussion in relation to the outcomes of governance 
reforms (Agrawal, 2001, Larson and Soto, 2008). 
 
Decentralization in Africa and other developing regions is closely linked to the current 
discussion about formation of partnerships particularly because natural resources are a 
necessary point of conflict and cooperation between central, local and peripheral 
authorities in any attempt to transfer powers from the centre (Ribot and Oyono, 2006). As 
‘decentralization is demand-driven’ (Mandondo and Kozanayi, 2006), external actors 
collaborate to put pressure on governments to prepare policy frameworks that allow the 
shift from centralized management systems to one that devolves management and 
ownership responsibilities to the local communities as well as allowing a greater role for 
private sector involvement (Nelson et al., 2007, Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007). As most 
developing country governments lack legal and institutional mechanisms to translate this 
global-driven orientation into workable situations, they find themselves relying on the 
same source for assistance in policy and legal formulation. This was, for example, the case 
in Tanzania’s natural resource sector where until the 1990s the country did not have 
policies (for land, wildlife, forest and mining) at the time when the management 
responsibilities were to be transferred from the central government. The old forest policy 
(1953) and Wildlife Conservation Act (1974) did not provide for participation and 
ownership of these resources by local communities. The first policies of the mid 1990s 
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were prepared with significant influence from conservation NGOs, which meant that in 
some cases, decentralization started with an insufficient policy and legal environment. 
  
There is evidence suggesting that policies and laws resulting from the decentralization 
process in Africa are a result of pressure from donors - the most active being the World 
Bank. Demand-driven decentralization has consequently forced governments to transfer 
powers to sub-groups rather than representatives of local populations (Bazaara, 2006), 
and to transfer resources that have no commercial value while also making decentralized 
decision-making more cumbersome through excessive oversight and approval 
processes (Namara, 2006, Kiwango et al., 2015). In practice, governments have placed 
imaginative obstacles in the path of decentralized institutions and choices (Ribot et al., 
2006: 1881). Rather than decreasing, bureaucracy and state interference continue – to the 
point of leading to full re-centralization of conservation efforts in some cases (Dressler et 
al., 2010: 13). Instead of decentralizing power, governments seem to be reinforcing 
upward accountability by transferring obligations to local authorities without sufficient 
funding, as well as keeping significant control and supervisory roles over the allocation of 
important commercial opportunities (including revenues from permits and licenses) 
(Mandondo and Kozanayi, 2006, Muhereza, 2006). Our interest is in investigating how 
decentralization conceals politics, and how partnerships are sites of power struggle are – 
these are visibly playing out in decisions about which powers to transfer and which 
institutions in the local arena to entrust with these powers (Shackleton and Campbell, 
2001, Ribot and Oyono, 2006, Berkes, 2010). 
 
2.3 Market-based conservation partnerships 
The proliferation of market-based strategies in wildlife conservation is considered to be 
an implicit success of neoliberal ideology, which links biodiversity conservation with 
economic growth (Van der Duim et al., 2015) and glorifies tourism as a global economic 
champion of development. Intuitively appealing, the pairing of tourism and conservation 
seems a convenient pathway out of the contradiction between the mantra of continuous 
growth and the reality of finite resources (Duffy, 2014), offering an apparent perfect fit for 
delivering ‘win-win-win’ solutions for conservation, poverty alleviation and tourism (Igoe 
and Brockington, 2007). By covering both conservation and human development, 
tourism becomes an integral part of the neoliberal conservation-development nexus 
(Igoe and Brockington, 2007). The World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) has reinforced 
this message globally for nearly three decades, often in tandem with the UN Secretariat 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).  
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The consistent efforts of UNWTO have earned worldwide recognition for tourism as a 
pivotal sector in global development. As one of world’s largest economic sectors, tourism 
generated almost 10% of global GDP and 284 million jobs in 2015 (World Travel Tourism 
Council, 2017). It is often mentioned as one of the key sectors in the path to achieving the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The potential of tourism to reap economic 
benefits has a mesmerising effect on private and public actors active in various sectors, 
and this effect is rather visible in the way conservation is organized in Africa, and in 
Tanzania in particular.  
 
By shifting the focus from use to conservation of wildlife, neoliberalism enables the 
extension of commodification beyond land and labour to include nature and the 
environment (West et al., 2004, Igoe and Brockington, 2007). As nature becomes ‘capital’, 
human-wildlife encounters as well as animals become ‘products’ ready to be sold to local 
and international markets (Duffy, 2014). In effect, tourism operates as a form of 
governance by shaping how visitors see the destination country, its nature, people and 
culture (Ooi, 2005). This is done through a process of generification, which involves 
reshaping local landscapes and values to fit preconceived Western-rooted categories of 
nature, locality and diversity (West & Carrier, 2004). In order to pay for values that they 
derive from experiencing nature and wildlife, tourists need to ‘fall in love’ with it. This 
perspective predicates the dependency of tourism on biodiversity, and links its success 
(or decline) to aesthetic values and the ability to attract tourists. A recent initiative of 
UNWTO of providing training on tourism and biodiversity in Africa shows how this point 
of view is promoted from high level of authority and with a relative sense of urgency:  
With the rapid growth of the tourism sector in West and Central Africa, tourism has 
become an important pillar for local economies in many destinations in the region. 
Challenges in preserving the biodiversity in an appropriate and quality environment 
may in the long run affect visitors´ satisfaction which ultimately would result in lower 
income generation from tourist related activities (UNWTO, 2015). 
 
Through commodification, conservation plays a key role in making tourism profitable. 
The institutional pressure created by tourism leads to the ‘flattening of nature’ (Duffy, 
2014) and a restructuring of conservation practices – transforming conservation actors 
and local communities into market actors, regardless of whether they have the will or the 
capacity to perform such functions in a meaningful way. Whereas tourism operators 
become influential gatekeepers of incoming tourist flows (Wearing and McDonald, 2002) 
and tourist choices turn into political power  (West et al., 2004), public-private 
partnerships and participatory processes are promoted as a way of balancing the 
influence of powerful business actors.  
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In essence, participatory structures that cumulate priorities for conservation and poverty 
with tourism, are meant to uphold the democratic involvement of all parties and secure a 
just distribution of responsibilities, costs and benefits from tourism development. The 
active involvement of local communities and public groups in participatory decision-
making is intended to provide social accountability (Nelson, 2012) and deter 
opportunistic appropriation of tourism benefits by politicians and business organizations. 
However, consortia of government and business organizations are able to create an 
illusion of partnership to local communities and legitimize pre-arranged plans, through 
clever manipulation of time and information (Anderson and Prideaux, Forthcoming). 
When local communities do not have the time or capability to develop their own vision 
for tourism developments, businesses have open space for imposing their own, and tend 
to boost their own economic interests over local social or environmental priorities 
(Moscardo, 2011).  
Successful governance of natural resources is often connected to plurality and 
democratic participation, and conditioned by the devolution of state authority to private 
actors or communities (Anderson and Leal, 2015). For the past couple of decades, African 
governments have reformed their governance structures – devolving land management 
rights to local communities as a key conservation policy approach. At the same time, 
tourism has been widely promoted on the premise that the economic benefits it 
generates can induce local communities to become supporters of conservation, and 
transform the livelihood activities that have undermined conservation, including 
poaching and grazing (Buckley, 2010, Elliott and Sumba, 2011, Spenceley and Snyman, 
2017). The fast uptake of partnerships for conservation that involve wildlife-based tourism 
business and communities throughout sub-Saharan Africa (Table 1) can be seen as an 
illustration of how neoliberalism has opened up the global South to tourism as an 
important source of economic wealth (Kent, 2003, Duffy and Moore, 2011). 
 
Table 1: Diffusion of conservation partnerships in Africa 
Institutional arrangement      Numbers over time 
 
Conservancies in Namibia 1 (1995) 4 (1998) 79 (2012) 
CBNRM in Botswana (registered 
community trusts) 
1 (1993) 2 (1995) 105 (2012) 
Private game ranches in South Africa 10 (1960s) 5,000 
(2000) 
11,600 (2012) 
Designated areas for hunting in Uganda 1 (2001)  16 (2014) 
Trans-frontier conservation areas in 
southern Africa 
1 (2000)  18 (existing and potential) 
(2013) 
AWF’s conservation enterprises across 
Africa 
1 (1999)  > 60 of which 65% is 
tourist related (2013) 
Source: Van Wijk et al. 2014, p. 245 
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Arguments in favour of governance reforms in wildlife management point out that moral 
responsibility is insufficient for deterring opportunistic behaviour by individual actors 
(Anderson and Leal, 2015) and natural resources must be placed under market 
mechanisms in order to create additional monetary incentives for conservation (Van der 
Duim et al., 2015). Reflecting principles of marketing environmentalism, proposals for 
market-based wildlife conservation are often grounded on critiques of state agencies’ 
chronic inefficiencies and limited competences for handling complex transboundary 
issues such as poverty, inequity and environmental degradation. The pragmatic efficiency 
and management skills of business organizations, pitted against limited capabilities of 
local communities to coordinate conservation, offer, in theory, a winning proposition for 
conservation dilemmas. The result is a veritable proliferation of hybrid governance 
structures as popular models for addressing global sustainability challenges, in private 
and in public arenas of governance (Hall, 2011). 
In essence, hybrid governance models are institutional innovations that emerge by 
involving private actors in conservation (previously under the control of the state), by 
creating new regulations and standards for social behaviour, and by creating a scope for 
business models geared towards social and environmental goals (Van der Duim et al., 
2015). Various forms of hybrid governance coexist and are situated on a continuum 
between free markets and hierarchical forms of governance. Still new in research as in 
practice, the emergence and functioning of hybrid governance in the context of 
conservation and tourism are unclear and require further research. However, known is 
that instead of empowering local communities to take charge and preserve natural 
resources, market-based conservation seem to reinforce existing structures of power and 
authority – excluding communities or reducing their input to policy making to a symbolic 
presence (Beaumont and Dredge, 2010, Moscardo, 2011).  
The perpetuation of inequities that accompanies hegemonic power structures generates 
conflicts that deepen the negative effects on the wellbeing of local communities and on 
conservation. The combined effects of multiple regulatory transformations seem to lead 
to the consolidation of power and control by state and private actors over natural 
resources. While public and private actors control the economic benefits, local 
communities are left with the responsibility of managing wildlife and their own livelihoods 
(Nelson, 2012). Top-down governing, under the influence of transnational conservation 
organizations, and the absence of conservation models that are rooted in and based on 
values of local communities are likely to lead to poor conservation and livelihood 
outcomes (Nshimbi and Vinya, 2014). Since it is unlikely that public and private actors 
relinquish some of these powers, further research is necessary into exploring under what 
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conditions can communities reclaim an active role in policy-making. 
 
3. Wildlife protection and tourism promotion in Tanzania 
The overall coverage of terrestrial protected and conserved areas – broadly 
understood here as areas conserved de facto, with or without the intervention of a 
conscious managing body – may be substantially larger (exceeding 35.5% of total 
land). These conserved territories ought to be taken into consideration as a system, 
as they are mutually supportive and beneficial. For instance, village forest reserves 
and community conserved wildlife habitats interact with state protected areas to 
provide areas for ecological connectivity and wildlife dispersal. While also meeting 
gaps in protection, these enhanced areas for conservation also provide opportunities 
for the development of tourism and other livelihoods (IUCN, 2017: 3) 
The passage above is part of the report of the IUCN-facilitated workshop for the 
assessment of actions and governance for conservation and sustainable livelihoods in 
Tanzania (21-22 March 2017). It speaks widely to the various issues of this paper, most 
importantly, on how conservation actors associate their activities with local development 
through tourism, and the importance that vast protected landscapes that are surrounded 
by community-conserved areas are considered mutually beneficial. It points to the fact 
that conservation and tourism in the case of Tanzania are highly interdependent. Indeed, 
the same legal and institutional framework under the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Tourism guide the two.  
Our specific empirical focus is the Selous game reserve and its surrounding landscapes, 
including two WMAs and an open hunting area in Rufiji district (see Figure 1). We 
investigate how conservation and tourism are negotiated in the landscape and what 
partnership networks exist and with what conservation and livelihood impacts. A more 
detailed presentation of the institutional environments and arrangements that operate in 
the selected cases will be made in future working papers. For the scope of this paper, it 
suffices to point out that the legal and institutional frameworks that govern conservation 
and tourism regulate activities beyond protected areas, to also cover communal lands 
that include wildlife management areas in village lands.  
The harmonisation of human and non-human landscapes is an act of scale construction 
that has been shaped considerably by consecutive waves of decentralization and 
devolution of rights over land and wildlife, with de-concentration and privatization 
playing a secondary role (see details of these reforms in Nelson et al., 2007, Nelson, 2012, 
Kiwango et al., 2015). Accordingly, policy reforms in the Tanzanian conservation-tourism 
nexus are better understood as reregulation (Castree, 2008), a process associated with 
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neoliberalization of conservation (Igoe and Brockington, 2007), which designates the use 
of public authority to transform previously untradeable things into tradeable 
commodities. This is achieved through different forms of territorialisation, such as the 
privatization of land (e.g. for private game reserves), the sub-division of collectively-held 
land or the issuing of collective legal titles to rural communities, which enable private 
partners to enter business ventures with outside investors or with NGOs (as in 
conservancies), and by delivering rents and issuing concessions to investors on state-
controlled territories (Igoe and Brockington, 2007).  
 
 
Figure 1: Selous game reserve and surrounding landscape in Rufiji District  
 
Source: authors 
Despite claims of decentralization, the ownership and control of wildlife in Tanzania 
remains firmly in the hands of the government. This allows the central government to 
control financial resources generated through tourism activities (hunting, photographic 
and safari tourism), and enable the appropriation and distribution of most benefits. As 
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through formal and informal relations shaped to extract private benefits. At the same time, 
responsibilities for managing land that accommodate wildlife outside protected areas are 
left to the local communities. Although policies declare interest in sharing costs and 
benefits between the state and communities, in fact the state controls (and retains) most 
benefits, while communities are mostly left with the costs of conservation (Igoe and 
Brockington, 2007). 
The success of policy reforms depends on the type of rights created, the types of land 
and wildlife use, and the capacity of local communities to organize the management of 
resources (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999). Citing collective action as a fundamental 
condition for successful devolution programs, Meinzen-Dick and Knox (1999) emphasize 
the importance of identifying the conditions that enable local communities to organize 
and manage natural resources. However, in Tanzania, the inequitable distribution of 
benefits from wildlife-based tourism is a source of conflict between state agencies and 
local communities, and between communities and private investors (Nelson, 2012). What 
research does not address explicitly is the cumulative effect of multiple policy reforms on 
the outcomes of conservation and whether they are fostering cooperation and local 
development.  
As tourism in Tanzania is mainly wildlife-based, it remains an important source of foreign 
exchange for the government and also for ruling elites and their collaborators. Since the 
1990s, earnings from wildlife-based tourism have registered sharp upward trends, rising 
from US$ 1.25 billion in 2010 (World Bank, 2012) to about US$ 2 billion in 2014 (Ndulu 
2015:3). In 2015, about 1.1 million tourists visited Tanzania, generating about US$ 2 
billion in revenue (URT, 2014). This revenue provides huge opportunity for rent seeking 
actors in the sector (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012, Benjaminsen et al., 2013), while 
also making plans and actions related to conservation and tourism highly interdependent.  
 
At present, Tanzania has the largest number of national parks in the world, with nearly 
40% of its land reserved for conservation (IUCN, 2017). Known to be a stable and safe 
country, it attracts a significant number of tourist investors but about 70% of the 1,200 
tourism businesses operating in or adjacent to national parks are foreign-owned (De Boer 
& Van Dijk, 2016). This has meant that a lot transactions take place outside Tanzanian 
economy and majority of profits are repatriated. Nevertheless, the World Bank cite 
Tanzania’s per capita yearly income as one of the lowest in the world at US$529, with 28% 
of people living below the poverty line (World Bank, 2015).  
 
What we derive from the literature generally, and the case of Tanzania’s decentralization, 
privatization and devolution of wildlife conservation in particular, is the proliferation of 
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hybrid forms of governance, and the emergence of conservation-oriented business 
ventures and community-based partnerships (CBPs) (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). 
Popular in addressing global challenges such as conservation or poverty, hybrid 
governance models reflect principles of market environmentalism and neoliberal 
doctrines, by having the transfer of control from state to non-state actors, and particularly 
private actors, as a defining aspect. Hybrid governance models are also institutional 
innovations that emerge by involving private actors in conservation, creating new 
regulations and standards for social behaviour, and opening a scope for business models 
geared towards social and environmental goals (van der Duim et al., 2014). In the 
following section, we pay particular attention to how these business models shape the 
formation of partnerships in the context of Tanzania’s wildlife sector.  
4. Business-community partnership (BCP) in Tanzania’s wildlife sector 
 
Partnerships between local communities and private businesses are sometimes called 
business-community partnerships (BCP) – one of the several forms of institutional 
arrangements used for the purpose of wildlife conservation in Eastern and Southern 
African countries (Van Wijk et al., 2015, de Boer and Van Dijk, 2016). However, BCP is not 
a universally agreed and applied way of describing such arrangements. Castley (2010) 
offers a typology of joint-venture operations in conservation tourism in the African context. 
In his typology, partnerships and CBNRM have a specific land management arrangement, 
where the community has some form of ownership and devolved management authority 
over their land. Community members form a community trust (or some form of 
representative organization) that becomes the stakeholder representative in interactions 
with other parties, such as private enterprises. Land ownership is also an important 
criterion for Carter et al. (2008), who categorize management regimes in private 
protected areas6 in Kenya and Tanzania broadly into two: managed solely by private 
entities; and managed jointly (Carter et al., 2008).  
 
BCPs are seen as joint collaborations between community organizations and a host of 
other partners (such as corporate entities and/or NGOs). Taking a broader perspective, 
van Wijk et al., (2014) present different institutional arrangements for conservation in 
selected African countries, such as conservancies in Namibia, CBNRM in Botswana and 
tourism conservation enterprises in Kenya. In all these institutional arrangements, 
																																																						
6 Private protected area is defined as ‘an area of land of conservation importance that is directly under the 
ownership and/or management of a private sector conservation enterprise for the purpose of biodiversity 
conservation’, while private sector enterprise being all non-state bodies such as companies and trusts 
(Carter et al., 2008: p. 178). 
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community-business ventures are possible, but their precise manifestations and 
operations depend on various factors, including the nature and degree of devolution of 
rights to local communities; the type of actors involved in administration and/or 
management of BCP; land tenure arrangements; legal standing of BCP; and the degree 
of devolution of land and natural resource use rights to local communities (Carter et al., 
2008, Ahebwa et al., 2012, Van Wijk et al., 2015).  
 
De Boer and Van Dijk, (2016) take their point of departure in acknowledging that a core 
principle in the functioning of BCPs is that conservation is required and local 
development is wanted. The distinction is important as it reflects the priorities set by the 
institutional set up of BCPs in Tanzania. Furthermore, they identify three models of 
generic BCPs distinguished by the number of communities participating in the 
partnership, the level of formal arrangements between the communities and the business 
involved. The three types are described briefly below, in order to describe the roles of 
different actors involved in BCPs. 
  
Business-Initiated Agreements 
In this model, the tour operator proposes to a community that an area of land be provided 
for tourist activities, and in return the village receives compensation in the form of a 
leasing fee and/or an agreed-upon fee per tourist/bed/night. The village is responsible 
for ensuring that the visiting tourists and their property are safe and that no activities are 
carried out that are harmful to the environment and incompatible with tourism activities, 
e.g. tree-cutting, cultivation and livestock grazing. These agreements typically involve a 
private sector investor and a village government, with village members being the direct 
beneficiaries of the agreement.  
 
NGO-Initiated Agreements 
Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) are generally placed under this category of 
agreements. Although these areas are initiated and continue to be facilitated largely by 
international NGOs concerned with wildlife conservation, the agreements that underpin 
them typically involve a private sector investor, central and local governments, a number 
of villages (and village representatives), and a civil society organization. As a matter of 
procedure, usually villages form a CBO to enter these agreements. Although villages 
should voluntarily join the CBO, once an area of the village is identified for conservation, 
a village has little choice but enter into an agreement to protect wildlife (Noe and 
Kangalawe, 2015, Bluwstein and Lund, 2016). In any case, usually member villages of the 
CBO contribute part of their land and agree to protect wildlife in place of prior uses such 
as cultivation, herding and settlements. The CBO in return receives a share of revenues 
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obtained from tourism activities carried out within their area. The Wildlife Division (WD) 
and the recently formed Tanzania Wildlife Authority (TAWA) regulate and monitor 
tourism activities outside protected areas, and collect revenues generated from tourism 
ventures. District councils are involved through a conservation advisory committee for the 
WMA. The District, in collaboration with the WD, also play a role in coordinating anti-
poaching activities – while NGOs such as AWF and WWF contribute funds to enable the 
establishment of the WMA and CBOs, as well as building human and technical capacity 
for conservation in areas such as resource management planning. Tour operators usually 
make an agreement with a CBO that has user rights (through their Authorized 
Association) to use a portion of village land or a WMA for setting up tented lodges for 
tourists. These operators invest in physical property, and are involved in promoting the 
area for tourism activities. They offer compensation to villages, usually based on a fee per 
tourist bed night (in the case of photographic tourism) or hunting fee (in the case of 
hunting tourism). More details of revenue collection and politics of sharing and utilization 
are discussed further in Noe et al., 2017b. 
 
Government-Initiated Agreements 
The last category is one grouping agreements that are made between the central 
government and a tourism hunting company, where villages are involved on a voluntary 
basis. The tour operator pays for the use of a hunting concession directly to the central 
authority, and a portion of the revenue is delivered to the district government. Some of 
these funds are intended for local development purposes, but the amounts received by 
villages have been reported to be small (Mariki et al., 2015, Wright, 2017, Noe et al., 
2017b). The district is expected to assist in anti-poaching activities, in collaboration with 
game rangers from the relevant wildlife authority. However, these local collaborations 
form part of the three types of agreements (as in De Boer & Van Dijk, 2016) which do not 
necessarily cover all institutional arrangements involved in conservation and tourism in 
Tanzania. However, they provide important distinctions in the way BCPs function, and why 
their legal status makes it difficult for them to fulfil their goals. Still, some of the literature 
suggests that business-initiated agreements are effective in achieving sustainability goals 
and are more equitable from the perspective of local communities (Farmaki et al., 2015) .  
 
Ahebwa et al., (2012) use the term private-community partnership (PCP) to describe ‘a 
particular form of hybrid intervention in which local benefits are claimed to be guaranteed 
through shared ownership of the tourism venture … [which is] often mediated by public 
and third sector organizations’. Elliott and Sumba (2010) use the term introduced by AWF, 
conservation enterprise, to describe a commercial enterprise that generates economic 
benefits in order to support conservation goals. The important distinction emphasized by 
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Elliot and Sumba (2010) is the role of management expertise in dividing responsibilities 
for the implementation and running of the partnership. In this model, local communities 
maintain ownership, while business competences are brought in by the private partner 
to run benefit-generating activities, such as tourism, agriculture and natural products (e.g. 
harvesting and processing honey). Business services, such as business planning, legal 
contracting, community engagement and raising capital, which are brought in by private 
actors are usually missing in the community. This way, AWF argues, the community keeps 
their rights over the natural resources set aside for conservation and gain from tourism-
generated benefits. According to Elliot and Sumba (2010) local ownership combined with 
private sector management is the most effective form of conservation enterprise.  
 
Communities that enter WMA agreements face extra challenges compared to other BCPs, 
which is why we focus on them. In practice, partnerships in WMAs are not entirely 
voluntary. Rather, they are a function of the ecological significance of the village land. 
Indeed, the law requires that communities as entities can exit WMA agreements, but the 
land they allocate to the WMA remains locked in. This way, communities lose the ability 
to decide on the use of its land. Consequently, radical changes in the way WMA decides 
to enter in business ventures require a general agreement among village members. As 
wishes, needs and interests of villages are different, as are influences of local elites within 
each village, conflicts arise during negotiations and agreements take a long time to be 
concluded. Another aspect where community members of WMAs are quite specific is 
relation to the distinction between ownership and management. In business-initiated 
agreements, the management of land and financial resources is negotiated between 
private investors and communities, which seems to lead to more equitable outcomes for 
communities. However, the state retains the control of financial streams emerging from 
the WMA business ventures, hence enabling opportunistic behaviour by local 
governments and political elites (Nelson, 2012). 
5. Unpacking partnerships: decision-making, power dynamics and benefit sharing 
 
A large share of critical discussion regarding impacts of BCPs relates to the control of 
economic benefits of tourism enjoyed by local elites (Bluwstein, 2017, Wright, 2017). 
These critical studies essentially question the use of the term ‘partnership’ in BCP because 
in reality, decision-making and revenue sharing structures and practices are often 
lopsided against community members who are not part of any elite grouping (Sachedina, 
2010, Ahebwa et al., 2012). A closer look within this discussion is needed to achieve a 
fine-grained understanding of how unequal and poorly distributed benefits arise from 
these partnerships.  
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Tourism BCPs essentially involve local communities and private tourism operators. A 
large number of BCPs also involve international NGOs that act as facilitators of the 
partnership process, helping local communities to review and select tourism operators, 
providing or finding funds for proposed tourism projects, and/or providing legal and 
administrative guarantees on behalf of the community vis-à-vis local and central 
governments and other stakeholders (Ahebwa et al., 2012, de Boer and Van Dijk 2016, 
Elliot and Sumba, 2010). Even when international NGOs are involved in good faith to 
facilitate tourism BCPs, this does not guarantee smooth and conflict-free collaboration 
between business and the community (Balint and Mashinya, 2006). In certain instances, 
NGOs actually exacerbate the power imbalance between business and the community, 
or within a community, by working together with (and hence legitimizing) a particular 
group of community members as local representatives (Simpson, 2008, Nelson, 2010). 
International NGOs themselves are powerful actors in the tripartite BCP arrangement 
because they hold financial resources and connections to local and central government 
offices and various stakeholders whom community members usually cannot access. This 
creates a situation where those representing the local community’s interests may have ‘a 
sense of indebtedness’ to its NGO counterpart and ‘a compromised ability to go against’ 
options and choices preferred or suggested by them (Ahebwa et al., 2012).  
 
This is not to conclude that the involvement of international NGOs (or any third party with 
genuine intention to facilitate the partnership process) inevitably leads to worsening 
power imbalances and unfair distributions of benefits. As Ribot’s work has shown, local 
NGOs can have precisely the same effect because they are not downwardly accountable 
to any electorate but are instead accountable through means of their own choosing to 
specific interest groups they exist to serve, as well as being upwardly accountable to 
donors (Ribot, 2002, Ribot et al., 2006, Ribot and Oyono, 2006). However, understanding 
how a third-party or facilitator may impact the decision-making and benefit-sharing 
process within BCPs is crucial for the analysis of power relations in sustainability 
partnerships more generally. This requires a close examination of the community that 
constitutes a main actor of the BCP. In highly heterogeneous African societies in terms of 
ethnicity, clan identity, lifestyle, etc., it is erroneous to assume the community to be 
internally unified and coherent (Baker, 1997, Southgate, 2006). That means when a 
community is asked to form a representative body to take part in a BCP, it opens up to 
the possibility of elite capture, and the resultant body often fails to account for broad 
experiences and needs of community members. Too often, community members do not 
know how to hold this representative body accountable, not to mention what economic 
benefits they are entitled when their community enters tourism BCPs (Balint and Mashinya, 
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2006, Simpson, 2008). Those representing the community in BCPs have been criticized 
for being not transparent about their profit distribution and decisions that economically 
and politically empower their family members and close associates (Gibson and Marks, 
1995, Balint and Mashinya, 2006). It is thus important to understand community agency, 
in particular whether and how villagers can oppose top-down conservation plans in their 
areas they disagree with, and whether they can hold community leadership accountable 
(Nelson, 2010, Nelson, 2012). 
 
BCPs stand on the premise of community ownership or operating rights over land and 
wildlife residing on the land, but in Tanzania, BCPs and other forms of community-based 
natural resources management have been heavily undermined in recent years. This led 
Benjaminsen et al. to denounce that ‘despite a decade of rhetoric on community 
conservation, current trends in Tanzania reflect a disturbing process of reconsolidation of 
state control over wildlife resources and increased rent-seeking behaviour, combined 
with dispossession of communities’ (2013: 1087). Until recently, the Tanzanian 
government mainly controlled hunting tourism, while communities were left to organize 
non-consumptive tourism (e.g. photographic tourism). In 2008, the state issued a 
reviewed policy for Non-Consumptive Utilization (Wildlife Regulations), which requires all 
non-consumptive tourism operations at the community level to seek legal registration 
with the Director of Wildlife (Benjaminsen et al., 2013). This regulation also stipulates that 
private tour operators have to pay fees to the central treasury that will then disburse them 
to villages and districts, not directly to communities that are involved in BCPs (Snyder and 
Sulle, 2011). These changes have adversely affected revenue earning by local 
communities, as the state retains monopoly over hunting tourism and the allocation of 
hunting blocks that are within village lands. 
 
The government of Tanzania continues to recentralize its control over wildlife and natural 
resources. Nelson (2012) claims that politicians at the central level have been amassing 
political influence by acquiring exclusive business opportunities. This blurred boundary 
between politics and business, as well as widespread corruption, are commonly observed 
features of natural resource governance in many African countries. Power struggles also 
happen along personal and communal patronage, and patron-client relationships are 
thought to be pervading at all levels of governing wildlife in Tanzania (Nelson, 2012, 
Nelson et al., 2007).  
 
Political ecologists are critical of livelihood impacts from conservation and tourism. Local 
elite’s capture of economic benefits from tourism has been a frequently cited problem 
and culprit for the small and/or unequal distribution of tourism revenues to ordinary 
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villagers (Balint and Mashinya, 2006, Gibson and Marks, 1995, Simpson, 2008). When 
economic benefits do not materialize to the extent community members have hoped, 
they can grow mistrust in the tourism BCP arrangement (Balint and Mashinya, 2006), thus 
weakening  its legitimacy and operational sustainability. These critiques evoke the sense 
of ‘green grabbing’ happening in conservation tourism (Green, 2016). It appears that not 
only governments and private enterprises engage in green grabbing, but also particular 
community members such as community chiefs with traditional authorities (Gibson and 
Marks, 1995) or highly-educated and business-savvy individuals (Southgate, 2006), who 
enact green grabbing by actively approaching private tourism operators and proposing 
tourism partnerships (Gardner, 2012, Green and Adams, 2015).  
 
In addition to livelihood concerns, studies have highlighted other socially negative 
outcomes. Gibson and Marks (1995) demonstrate how safari hunting tourism on 
community-managed land in Zambia fails to consider the social role of hunting in 
assigning and reinforcing the identity of lineage hunters within the community – 
particularly after making community members give up unlicensed hunting.  In Southgate 
(2006), ecotourism BCP led to drawing boundaries around a wetland as conservation 
area and this has eroded trust-based relationships between different clans who used to 
access and use this area on friendly terms. Similarly, Green and Adams, (2015) and De 
Boer and Van Dijk, (2016), report that when multiple communities are involved in 
conservation tourism projects with private enterprise partners, inter-community conflicts 
can arise over whether communities located far from the conservation area can claim the 




This review of the literature on partnerships for wildlife protection sought to re-examine 
the win-win-win rhetoric that drives emergent hybrid forms of governance, given their 
increased popularity in wildlife conservation throughout Africa. Grounded in neoliberal 
ideologies, this rhetoric promises simultaneous achievement of various economic and 
socio-economic benefits through appealing combinations of conservation and tourism 
as solutions to the conundrum of challenges typically involved by such ambitious goals. 
This review set to examine the emergence of partnerships between state agencies, 
businesses and local communities in wildlife conservation, and their contribution to 
delivering the ‘win-win-win’ promises. The analysis of the literature confirms that hybrid 
partnerships are the result of cumulative effects of political and institutional forces that 
active in conservation and in tourism. In Tanzania, successive waves of decentralization, 
privatization and evolution of wildlife conservation enabled the emergence of a wide 
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variety of formal and informal partnerships, but the outcomes of their functioning so far 
seem to have been skewed to benefit largely selected elites, thus aggravating local power 
struggles.  
 
Theoretically, three main groups of literature inform further examinations into the 
functioning of conservation partnerships in the African context, and specifically in 
Tanzania. Perspectives grounded in landscape ecology theories argue for enlarged 
scales of conservation as a way to re-establish ecological connectivity. At the same time, 
governance theories – applied to conservation and tourism – provided arguments in 
favour of shifting responsibilities for wildlife protection from central government to local 
institutions and communities, and led to the creation of institutional fields that nurture the 
emergence of various forms of community-based conservation models. A third group of 
literature, informed by principles of market environmentalism, argues that market forces 
are most suited to offer strong incentives for conservation, by adding economic gains to 
its goals. What becomes clear from these three bodies of literature are the various 
rationalities that justify the emergence of a disjointed landscape of political and 
institutional forces which, while arguing for territorial unity, impose the fragmentation of 
ownership, management and responsibility for conservation outcomes at local levels. The 
state’s tight control over benefits extracted from wildlife management is placed in stark 
contrast with the insurmountable costs incurred by local communities in charge of 
managing it – in terms of livelihoods, security and human development. For conservation-
based tourism partnerships, success would involve a balanced distribution of benefits 
and costs associated with wildlife conservation and management among partnership 
members.   
 
By trading ‘use’ for ‘conservation’ of wildlife, nature is being commodified to include 
labour, land and the environment. And through commodification, tourism overrides 
conservation priorities, transforming conservation actors into market agents, and placing 
the pressure of economic performance onto conservation structures. Despite principles 
of ecotourism and sustainable tourism that are politically promoted in conjunction with 
conservation, the absence of proper selection and monitoring criteria for tourism 
investors in conservation enables the emergence of models of tourism that perpetuate 
hegemonic powers, in isolation from local communities. Explicit analyses of the direct and 
indirect interferences of tourism business (and associated global value chains) in 
conservation ventures would provide beneficial knowledge to the understanding of 
partnership dynamics and their outcomes.  
 
NEPSUS Working Paper 2017/2 27 
Despite ample criticism, the involvement of tourism in conservation thrives under 
neoliberalism and is a common feature in the global political economy (Ahebwa et al., 
2012). This relative success demands more effort in studying the relationships between 
political rhetoric, the values of end-users (tourists) and the translation of these 
relationships into market practices (West et al., 2004, Farmaki et al., 2015). For tourism to 
fulfil sustainability goals related to conservation, poverty and human development, it 
needs consistent and non-extractive governmental intervention (monitoring, incentives) 
and the generalized adoption and application of sustainability values by the institutional 
frameworks and networks that organize its provision and consumption (Moscardo and 
Murphy, 2014). Further research is necessary in order to identify the conditions in which 
the global tourism market could support the flourishing of forms of tourism that have seek 
to meet profitability, conservation and poverty alleviation goals. 
 
Through the critical lenses of political ecology, this review of literature highlighted 
important contradictions in the development and functioning of hybrid partnerships that 
are active in conservation, which require further examination. Interrogations of gains and 
losses have mainly provided indications of how partnerships legitimise processes of 
securing land and access to wildlife which intensify the marginalization of local 
communities thereby indirectly aggravating local power struggles. Drawing from 
different theoretical perspectives – conservation scale, governance reforms and market-
based conservation partnerships – the paper brings a new dimension to the 
conceptualization of partnerships in natural resource management, namely, the ways that 
different partnership configurations emerge, whether and how their degree of 
complexity might influence both wildlife conservation and livelihood outcomes. Further 
analyses of the contextual aspects influencing these configurations and complexity as 
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